T he landscape of the global economy is increasingly dotted with institutions that regulate investment and trade. The number of bilateral investment treaties (bIts) and preferential trade agreements (ptas) stand out in this regard, with nearly every country a member of at least one of these institutions, if not many. Yet, for all the scholarly attention paid to investment treaties and trade agreements, the relationship between bIts and ptas remains little understood. We seek to fill in this important gap in the literature, focusing specifically on whether investment treaties with rich governments help poor ones conclude north-south trade agreements. 1 our argument is in two parts. first, we conjecture that a bIt between a developed country and a developing one increases the odds that they will subsequently sign a pta. second, we further conjecture that this pair of states is less likely to negotiate a pta if the developing country has many investment treaties or trade agreements with other wealthy states. In other words, we predict a curvilinear relationship between bIts and north-south ptas, in that having too many of these institutional memberships is likely to decrease the odds of signing another trade agreement. In this sense, a bIt is better than a lot.
Why might this be so? Wealthy states want bIts as an institutional check against uncompensated expropriation. They also want ptas because such institutions make it cheaper for their multinational corporations (mncs) to get inputs to, 2 and exports from, a "host" country.
3 since trade agreements are more politically costly to negotiate than investment treaties, given their deeper and reciprocal obligations, wealthy governments have an incentive to supply ptas only where there are sizable electoral returns from doing so. This is most likely where trade agreements confer exporter rents-excess returns, or supernormal profits, that are insulated from competition by the pact's preferential terms 4 -on domestic multinationals. These exporter rents can be congested by foreign multinationals where a poor government has many investment or trade agreements with other developed countries. This is because greater competition has the effect of undermining this preferential market access.
Developing countries, too, have an incentive to couple bIts and north-south ptas to attract foreign direct investment (fdI) and increase trade. Yet, for poor governments, investment treaties are not just instrumental in this regard. on the contrary, developing countries see bIts and ptas with rich governments as serving key political objectives, including shoring up human rights and entrenching democracy-goals that encourage developing countries to sign many of these institutions. 5 The problem, though, is that having too many of these treaties reduces their odds of getting a pta with a given developed country since, if others enjoy preferential treatment as well, exporter rents can become congested. We test these hypotheses using annual data on pairs of developing and developed countries between 1960 and 2004, and use propensity score matching to contend with possible concerns for endogeneity. The results strongly endorse our argument.
Two implications follow. first, to the extent that entering into a bIt makes it more likely that a pair of countries subsequently signs a north-south pta, investment treaties can hardly be dismissed as cheap talk. rather, bIts help set the groundwork for concluding trade agreements with deeper and reciprocal obligations, and in this sense may a b I t I s b e t t e r t h a n a l o t have a greater indirect, as opposed to a direct, effect on attracting fdI than has previously been appreciated. Given that the literature is currently stalemated on the question of whether bIts attract fdI, we submit that analyzing their relationship with ptas may help clarify the causal mechanism by which these institutions are expected to entice foreign capital. our theoretical argument suggests why this ought to be the case.
second, having many investment treaties does not increase the likelihood that a poor government will subsequently get a trade agreement. The tipping point in our sample is five bIts, which, importantly, is roughly two fewer than the number ratified by the average developing country in our study. In fact, for a country like Bangladesh, which has an above-average number of bIts with developed countries, entering into another investment treaty with a rich government actually decreases its odds of forming a north-south pta. our findings thus caution against the view that poor governments should negotiate as many bIts or ptas as possible to signal that they are "open for business" and committed to economic liberalization more generally. Indeed, because developing countries are likely to enjoy greater prosperity where investment and trade reforms coincide, 6 the challenge is to sign the right deals initially, since subsequent deals are less likely to be as appealing to rich governments intent on securing exporter rents for their multinationals.
This article proceeds as follows: section II elaborates our argument. section III discusses our research design. section IV presents our results. And section V concludes by discussing some of the more salient implications of our work.
II. argument
In framing our argument, we need to answer three questions: first, what are bIts and ptas supposed to do? second, why do developed countries have an incentive to follow up on investment treaties with trade agreements only if developing countries do not already have too many bIts or ptas with other developed ones? And third, why are developing countries prone to signing more investment treaties and trade agreements than their developed-country partners would prefer? The paper's main theoretical contribution is to explain the tension between the first and second questions-in other words, from a rich government's point of view, why do developing countries often have too many are so confident that these institutions deliver the intended results, they have converged on a set of standards within investment treaties 12 such that we can meaningfully talk about bIts without concern for any significant variation in their design. 13 A great deal has been written on ptas, but for our purposes the key issue is simply that they extend preferential terms to members versus nonmembers.
14 Indeed, special market access is the hallmark of these institutions. They go beyond the World Trade organization's (wto) most-favored-nation (mfn) requirement, which says that all members have the same access to each other's markets, and provide "supermfn" access to their members-enabling them to conduct commerce on even better terms. historically, this has been because pta members have faced lower import barriers, such as tariffs, but more recently it is also because members agree to obligations that are not-or not as strongly-included in the wto. for example, many ptas extend terms on intellectual property and traded services that reach much deeper than the multilateral trade regime, obligations that are important to our argument. These terms are allowed under wto rules, in that Article xxIv of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (gatt) permits super-mfn concessions so long as the pta covers substantially all trade rather than being sector-specific, and that the special market access afforded to members not result in increased protectionism against nonmembers, who must still be given mfn access. Thus, a multinational with special market access to a developing country could send inputs to, and export back home or to third markets, at less cost than its competitors-constituting what we call an exporter rent.
These exporter rents are crucial because, in contrast to bIts, which impose little political cost on developed countries (whose domestic legal systems are typically up to the task of handling investor disputes), ptas involve deeper and reciprocal obligations and thus are likely to mobilize antitrade constituents. As a result, without the prospect of excess returns, domestic multinationals are unlikely to support trade agreements and reward governments for supplying them. In this sense, it is perhaps unsurprising that investment treaties have historically outnumbered trade agreements by about ten to one. 12 sacerdoti 1997. 13 We do not mean to suggest that there is no variation in the design of bIts. Allee and Peinhardt (2008) and Yackee (2008) consider differences across dispute settlement procedures, for example. our point is simply that, by virtue of most favored nation (mfn), and the fact that bIts uniformly provide for dispute settlement (Dolzer and stevens 1995) , these differences are not germane to our argument. 14 Milner 1997; Bagwell and staiger 2001. of course, none of this is to suggest that poor governments see the relationship between bIts and ptas in precisely the same way that rich governments do. on the contrary, we contend that developing countries use investment treaties and trade agreements to accomplish broad political objectives as well as economic ones, and that this is why they are at risk of signing too many bIts and ptas-as viewed from the perspective of developed countries. We establish in section III the tipping points for investment treaties and trade agreements. It is also important to repeat that our focus is solely on how bIts make north-south ptas more likely; by no means are we suggesting that our argument explains the relationship between investment treaties and either southsouth or north-north trade agreements. That said, we contend that our more narrow focus nonetheless captures most of the action that is unfolding in the global economy today.
developed countrIes and bIts/ptas Multinationals in developed countries look to outsource some of their production to developing countries, enticed by cheaper labor and market access. 15 There are two concerns inherent in pursuing this strategy: the risk of expropriation and the transaction costs of getting inputs to and exports from their foreign affiliates. bIts address the first concern, and ptas the second, which is why they are likely to be coupled together by developed countries. While the intuition of this hypothesis may ring familiar, it has not, to the best of our knowledge, been subjected to empirical scrutiny. That said, it is easy to find cases in which this logic plays out in practice. for example, the u.s. explains that due to Africa's "generally low levels of economic, administrative, and regulatory development," it is using bIts "to transition from u.s.-Africa trade and investment relationships based on one-way trade preferences to deeper, more reciprocal partnerships, such as that established by a trade agreement."
16 Along these same lines, united states Trade representative robert Zoellick announced in 2004 that the signing of a bIt with Pakistan would lead to a free-trade agreement between the two countries. 17 15 It is important to keep in mind that p tas impose rules of origin to prevent the transshipment of goods from nonmembers through members. If, in an effort to overcome these rules of origin, a nonmember's multinationals invest in a member's economy, this would be consistent with our argument, since they too would have incentive to demand bIts to protect their investment and would likely have p tas to get their goods home at lesser cost. even if they do not export home (and thus do not demand p tas), this would still be consistent with our argument, since it raises the prospect that exporter rents will be congested, as we explain more fully below.
16 ustr 2008. 17 Piracha 2004. Indeed, provisions for third-party dispute settlement in the event of uncompensated expropriation are the central tenet of investment treaties, while trade agreements lower protection on a reciprocal and preferential basis, enabling firms to more readily trade with their foreign affiliates. The novel twist in our argument, however, is that too many BITs or PTAs between a developing country and a number of rich countries deters a given developed country from entering into such institutions with it.
To start, rich-country mncs lobby strongly for the adoption of bIts. In fact, even when mncs can obtain firm-specific concessions on their investment from a host country, it is still important to gain the backing of their home government in sponsoring a bIt. for example, Dow chemical, which has received special treatment on its investments from developing countries, nonetheless identifies bIts as the pillar of its fdI and trade strategy.
18 This is because bIts lower the overall transaction costs of investing abroad by strengthening the legal environment and ensuring that both its home and host governments are fully and credibly engaged in resolving any disputes. 19 This, in short, is why wealthy states have an incentive to enter into both bIts and ptas: to protect multinationals' assets from being nationalized without compensation and to lessen the cost of doing business with offshore affiliates.
This line of reasoning is further strengthened by considering two possible concerns. first, one might object that fdI itself ought to induce the developed (home) country to unilaterally cut tariffs on its trade with the developing (host) country in order to reduce transaction costs for its multinationals. In other words, a bIt might accomplish what these mncs would want from a pta. emily Blanchard calls this the "fdI terms of trade effect," associating it to the demands made of rich governments by export-platform fdI.
20 Yet, she offers two reasons to suspect that investment treaties and trade agreements play the roles we posit: first, this effect "cannot persist under threat of expropriation;" and second, it can be strongly undermined by measures that discriminate between the country's own exporters operating abroad and the developing country's exporters. A bIt addresses the first possibility, a pta the second. note, too, that where export-platform fdI is focused strictly on selling to third markets and not back to the home market, the need for ptas is greater still, given opportunities to discriminate among exporters in this case. second, one might object that where multinationals invest abroad strictly to sell to the target market rather than to re-export, coupling a bIt with a pta is unnecessary. After all, the logic of this "horizontal fdI" would remove any concern on the part of a multinational for (home) protectionism against the foreign (host) market, such that it might be content with just an investment treaty. Yet, both theory and evidence suggest that "vertical fdI," which involves outsourcing production to exploit cost savings, is more important, especially with respect to north-south commerce. stephen ross Yeaple, for example, identifies a strong comparative-advantage motive for fdI between countries with large differences in their relative factor abundance. 21 Given our focus on investment and trade between rich and poor states, this would lead us to expect that vertical fdI would be the main motivation for multinationals looking to invest in developing countries, and thus we should expect them to demand ptas as well as bIts. Various studies bear out this assessment. for example, unctad observes that "[t]oday we see less horizontal fdI and more vertical fdI that seeks the most efficient location."
22 unctad traces this to the liberalization of investment and trade regimes and falling transport costs-the absence of which might otherwise have inspired horizontal fdI. In much the same spirit, Theodore Moran points out that, for rich-country mncs, vertical networks from developing-country affiliates are more important to their business than selling to host markets. 23 Looking at u.s. mnc-affiliate sales, data from the Bureau of economic Analysis indicate that for 2006, 80 percent conform to the logic of vertical fdI, whereas only 20 percent match the pattern of horizontal fdI. Thus, for both theoretical and empirical reasons, we contend that it is appropriate to build an argument about north-south bIts and ptas around the logic of vertical fdI.
of course, trade agreements are more politically costly than investment treaties for developed countries to sign, such that taking the next step from bIts to ptas is not pro forma. bIts impose few additional obligations on rich governments, given that curbs on expropriation are already in place, and the efficacy of their courts in handling such cases is rarely called into question. for these reasons, acting on the demands of multinationals for bIts as a check against expropriation is not overly burdensome. Trade agreements, on the other hand, involve deeper and reciprocal obligations, and thus greater legislative action, which in turn can mobilize antifree-trade constituents. This means that ptas have to deliver a sizable windfall for mncs, who might then be expected to reward their governments for signing a trade agreement.
The main consideration, in this regard, is whether the pta promises exporter rents. By their nature, ptas give preferential market access to multinationals in member countries. These preferences are akin to market imperfections and, like entry barriers more generally, prevent profits from being competed away. The multinationals based in member countries can thus earn excess returns that are insulated from competition with mncs from nonmember countries. for example, the benefits to european car makers from the european union's pta with Mexico were seriously called into question once the north American free Trade Agreement (nafta) extended similar concessions to u.s. car makers in 2004, leading Volkswagen to doubt its prospects for selling not only in Mexico, but in other markets as well, including the united states. 24 our point is that the fewer the member countries in a pta, the greater the expected exporter rents, since, to put it simply, preferences become less preferential as more firms gain access to them, increasing competition and eroding any excess returns. We refer to this as the congestion of exporter rents.
This logic is well rehearsed in the economics literature on trade agreements. As Gene Grossman and elhanan helpman explain, industries have an incentive to support ptas that are trade diverting since these promise private gain-exporter rents-and make them more politically viable for governments to pursue. 25 Pravin Krishna arrives at the same conclusion, observing that trade-diverting ptas create rents for producers that are tied to the agreements' preferences, and warns that unless liberalization provides sufficient rents to offset the loss of those preferences, producers are unlikely to support multilateral trade talks.
26 even in the case of ptas signed for noneconomic reasons (such as rewarding an ally), nuno Limão insists that higher preferences are crucial to the bargaining power of the country granting a trade pact, meaning that these, too, are subject to congestion, which is why they are just as likely to impede multilateral liberalization. 27 All of this is to say that having too many ptas can negatively impact the prospect of signing another trade agreement. But it also indicates that having too many bIts can be a deterrent as well, since investment can substitute for trade and inflows of fdI serve to increase competition in the economy 24 http://wehner.tamu.edu/mgmt.www/nAfTA/spring98/Groups/03/Assignment3.htm. 25 Grossman and helpman 1995. 26 Krishna 1998 . 27 Limão 2002. more generally. Both jeopardize exporter rents that rich governments look for in signing ptas. We test both these conjectures below.
summing to this point, we argue that developed countries have an incentive to enter into bIts and ptas with poor governments because multinationals want protection against uncompensated expropriation and they want the ability to get inputs to, and exports from a developing country. The wrinkle in the story, however, is that we expect rich governments to be leery of pursuing a trade agreement with a poor government that has many bIts or ptas with other wealthy states because of their concern that the additional agreements with those other countries will reduce their exporter rents.
developIng countrIes and bIts/ptas
There is little that is controversial in arguing that developing countries sign bIts as a way to increase inflows of fdI. The intuition is that by forsaking uncompensated expropriation and submitting to provisions for third-party dispute settlement, they are likely to receive more fdI, lower their cost of capital at home, and gain better access to technology and managerial skills. ever since Pakistan signed the first bIt with Germany in 1959, this has been the main objective of ratifying investment treaties.
But like their rich counterparts, poor governments recognize that ptas round out this story. Indeed, if, as we argue above, mncs worry not only about the risk of expropriation, but also about the cost of getting inputs to, and exports from, an investment location, then developing countries, too, have an incentive to enter into both types of institutions. Moreover, since trade agreements include obligations that, as in the case of intellectual property and traded services, are deeper than those under the wto, they may prove especially effective in recruiting footloose capital.
other studies also suggest that developing countries that enter both investment and trade agreements may attract more fdI. for example, Tim Büthe and helen Milner argue that countries with more bIts and ptas are likely to receive larger inflows of fdI, a conjecture borne out by their results.
28 While we do not examine fdI in this paper, our argument speaks to Büthe and Milner's research in two important respects. first, having an investment treaty makes a north-south trade agreement between the partners more likely in the first place. Developing countries have, themselves, called attention to this linkage. As one senior uruguayan government official explained just days after completing a bIt with the u.s., "[T]he basis for negotiations are already in place and we are sure that there will be a bilateral [trade] agreement before the end of this period."
29 More telling still is the case of Mauritius: despite having a court system that is seen as being more than capable of handling investor disputes, 30 the country has signed several bIts, the goal of which, as one diplomat professed, is to set the stage for ptas.
31
second, as we explain above, having too many of either of these institutions is likely to congest exporter rents and lowers the odds that a pair of states will sign a north-south pta. In other words, there should be a number beyond which more memberships in both bIts and ptas proves counterproductive. We estimate this tipping point for bIts and ptas and find that the average developing country in our sample is well above these threshold values; as such, they are less likely to get an additional pta with any given developed country. In fact, for countries in the top quartile of bIt formation in our sample, entering into a bIt actually decreases the odds of forming a pta with that partner.
32
The final step in our argument, therefore, is to explain why developing countries are at risk of signing more bIts or ptas than would be optimal from the point of view of developed countries worried about exporter rents. one reason is simple: competition. In hoping to get noticed by foreign investors-let alone attract footloose capital-poor governments often have to vie for attention with their neighbors, match their neighbors' concessions, and promote the view that a greater number of institutional memberships means even less room for backsliding on their commitments. Along these lines, Zachary elkins, Andrew Guzman, and Beth simmons show that developing countries are more likely to sign a bIt if rival jurisdictions have already done so, indicating that these investment treaties may sometimes be more about "keeping up with the Joneses" than setting the stage for ptas per se.
33
More broadly, though, the feature that makes bIts and ptas potentially useful in attracting fdI and trade-i.e., their ability to help governments tie hands-makes them relevant to a wide variety of other political objectives that would encourage signing many, not fewer, of these institutions. for example, some observers have asked whether 29 fernández 2006, author's translation. 30 The heritage foundation's 2008 Index of Economic Freedom ranks Mauritius eighteenth in the world with its indices for investment freedom, property rights, and business freedom scoring at least ten percentage points higher than the world average. 31 Interview with Vinod Busjeet, minister counselor, embassy of the republic of Mauritius. 32 one might ask whether south-south p tas could substitute for north-south p tas if they do fall off under these circumstances. The literature suggests not, pointing out that north-south p tas, in particular, have proven to be catalysts of economic growth for poor governments, in contrast to southsouth pacts. see, for example, Venables 1999; Berthelon 2004; Mayda and steinberg 2008. 33 elkins, Guzman, and simmons 2006.
w o r l d p o l I t I c s bIts can substitute for weak domestic institutions both in terms of the content of local investment regimes as well as the very capacity to oversee commercial activities more generally. 34 Perhaps most obviously, the literature on bIts and fdI nearly universally taps into the notion that developing countries enter into greater numbers of bIts to attract greater fdI flows.
35 similarly, edward Mansfield shows that countries enter into greater numbers of ptas to assure their access to foreign markets in case of disruptions to the international trading system.
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But the bigger picture is that ptas are scrutinized as much for what they do politically as economically. By way of example, emilie hafnerBurton argues that where ptas link "hard" human rights standards to commercial sanctions, they may enable repressive governments that wish to change their ways to enforce provisions that would otherwise be opposed domestically. 37 Tapping a similar logic, Jon Pevehouse finds that joining international institutions like ptas can help autocracies make the transition to democracy where the membership is largely comprised of liberal states. This is because these institutions have conditionality clauses-subject to dispute settlement-and because of the wider reputational cost to be incurred in the event of a defection.
38
These political aims are especially likely to motivate developing countries to sign as many bIts and ptas as possible, since, unlike in the case of some economic aims, there are few substitute means available for committing to these policies.
each of these arguments suggests that more institutional memberships help poor governments achieve broader goals, and in this sense, developing countries are unlikely to show the restraint that developed countries, motivated by exporter rents, would like to see on the part of their would-be trade partners. This disconnect is crucial to our argument and underpins the curvilinear relationship that we posit between the number of bIts and ptas a developing country has signed with other wealthy states and its likelihood of securing another northsouth trade agreement with any given developed country.
our hypotheses are the following:
-h1. If a developing country has a bIt with a developed country, the two states are more likely to sign a p ta. Corollary 1. This positive association will decrease as the overall number of bIts signed by the developing country with other wealthy states increases.
-h2. If a developing country has relatively few bIts with other wealthy states, it is more likely to sign a p ta with a given developed country, but if it has many bIts with other wealthy states, it is less likely to sign a p ta with a given developed country.
-h3. If a developing country has relatively few p tas with other wealthy states, it is more likely to sign a p ta with a given developed country, but if it has many p tas with other wealthy states, it is less likely to sign a p ta with a given developed country.
III. research desIgn
We estimate a model of the determinants of north-south ptas, focusing on the role played by bIts in particular. While there is no generalizable model of pta formation, our specification follows from our argument and includes controls identified in the literature as being especially influential in this regard. our model takes the following form: a north-south pta depends on dyad-specific characteristics (d); hostcountry specific characteristics (z); regional characteristics (r); fixed time effects (t); and an error term (e). our theory leads us to believe that pta formation also depends on: (1) the existence of a bIt in force between a rich and a poor country (bit); (2) the number of bIts in force in the host country (bitsum), minus the bIt with the partner, if it exists; (3) the square of that term, in order to gauge whether the relationship between bIts and ptas is, in fact, nonlinear (bitsum 2 ); (4) the interaction between the bitsum and the individual investment treaty, to assess whether the effect of an individual country-pair bIt on pta formation is conditional on the number of bIts a developing country signs more generally (bit * bitsum); and (5) the number of ptas in force in the host country (ptasum) as well as the square of that term to gauge its linearity (ptasum 2 ):
each of the variables is indexed by countries (i) and/or ( j) and time (t). The dependent variable, pta, is coded 1 the year that a developed and developing pair of countries, i and j, enters into a trade agreement and 0 otherwise. once a country pair forms a pta they drop from the analysis in subsequent years.
The vector d contains a series of dyad-specific characteristics: trade (trade flows between the dyad partners); distance (geographic distance between the dyad partners); skill (skill difference between the dyad partners, as a proxy for the similarity of factor endowments); income (difference between the dyad partners' gross domestic product [gdp] per capita, to gauge the similarity of their economies); and alliance (membership of the dyad partners in a formal alliance).
The vector z contains a series of country-specific variables that we always include for the developing country and, for purposes of robustness, later include for the developed country: wto (membership in the World Trade organization or its predecessor institution, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade); gdp per capita (a proxy for the strength of the economy); polity (the country's level of democracy, as a proxy for political risk); and the natural log of population (a proxy for the market size of the economy).
The vector r contains a series of regional dummies to capture the possibility of unmeasured regional influences on the propensity to form ptas. summary statistics for all variables are available in Appendix 1(a and b).
varIables As the focus of our analysis is on the formation of a pta between specific countries based on whether that dyad has a bIt in place, our unit of analysis is the country dyad-year. We analyze only north-south dyads for two reasons. first, as we explain above, ptas signed between two poor governments typically have different origins and effects than those between other pairings, as the theoretical and empirical literatures on the subject make abundantly clear. second, and perhaps more important, bIts between developing countries are quite different from those signed between a developed and a developing country. until the 1990s, poor governments rarely signed investment treaties with each other. currently, bIts between two developing countries, while growing in popularity, are often signed for reasons other than attracting investment flows. Developed countries are excluded as host countries from the analysis, since wealthy states (almost) never sign bIts with each other. 39 In 2004, for example, the four largest foreign investors in the u.s. were Britain, france, Japan, and the netherlands, yet the united states did not have (nor does it have plans to negotiate) a bIt with any of these countries. In short, states with confidence in each other's investment environments do not conclude investment treaties. our goal is to understand how efforts to increase this level of confidence, through a bIt, might set the stage for subsequently signing a trade agreement.
our dependent variable, pta, is coded 1 in the year that a trade agreement between dyad partners went into force and 0 otherwise. new countries entering an existing pta are scored 1 in the year that the host country enters the pta and 0 in prior years. once a country pair has entered into a pta they drop out of the analysis in subsequent years. We include all types of ptas (for example, free trade agreements, customs unions, common markets, and economic unions) 40 reported to the World Trade organization or made publicly available by the partner states. This results in a total of 204 agreements in our data set. 41 We measure bIts in two ways. first, our bit variable is measured 1 in the year that an investment treaty between dyad partners takes effect and each subsequent year, and 0 otherwise. second, our bitsum variable is equal to the count of bIts in effect between the host country and all oecd countries in each time period minus the bIt between the dyad partner, if one exists. Any pta between a dyad that includes an investment chapter equivalent to an investment treaty is also counted as a bIt (so that the dyad drops out of the data set in the year that the pta enters into force; the pta is being counted, but the bIt is not counted as preceding the pta). The individual bit variable is lagged by two years to account for any possibility (nearly nonexistent in the data set) that ptas may be a determinant of bIts.
42 similarly, our ptasum variable is equal to the count of ptas in effect between the host country and all other oecd countries in each time period.
To assess the relationship between bIts and ptas, we must also control for other factors that are likely to lead to trade agreements between a developing and a developed country. since our unit of analysis is the country pair, we control for factors that are both dyad and host specific. Paul Krugman and Jeffrey frankel et al. show that greater distance between countries indicates increased transportation, transaction, and contracting costs, and thus should lower the likelihood of trade flows and, as a result, of a pta.
43 Thus, the greater the geographic distance between countries, the lower the probability that the country pair will 40 regional p tas, which tend to be concluded between developing countries, were not included in the analysis. however, p tas such as naf ta or between the eu and a developing country that serve as a series of bilateral p tas, were included. 41 The w to currently lists 421 agreements in their database. our data set excludes agreements between developing countries, which accounts for the difference in number. 42 The results are nearly identical regardless of whether we include a one-or three-year lag. 43 Krugman 1991; frankel, stein, and Wei 1995. form a pta. The variable distance measures the geographic distance between dyad partners' capital cities and follows the great-circle formula articulated by Thierry Mayer and soledad Zignago, which uses the relevant latitudes and longitudes.
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A number of authors have speculated that ptas may be as much a response to trade as a source of it. 45 We account for this by including a measure of trade flows between country pairs, the idea being that the greater this volume of commerce, the higher the probability that the dyad will form a pta. The variable trade measures exports flowing from the host country to the partner country in millions of constant u.s. dollars, lagged two years. 46 The data are from Kristian Gleditsch. 47 It is a compilation of the International Monetary fund annual time series and the World export Data. 48 scott Baier and Jeffrey Bergstrand find that ptas are more likely between country pairs when those countries have the economic characteristics that theory predicts would enhance trade between those countries.
49 specifically, countries with larger and more similar economies and factor endowments are more likely to enter into ptas. countries with large domestic markets have less need to access foreign markets and those with similar economies tend to trade more with each other. We account for these considerations with a measure of the size and purchasing strength of the economy, gdp per capita, measures for differences in the size of the economy, and available factor endowments. The variable skill difference is the difference between the percentage of the labor force in the partner and host country that have a tertiary education (available from World Development Indicators). 50 Income, a measure of the difference in the size of the dyad partners' economies, is the difference in gdp per capita between the partner and host country two years earlier (available from World Development Indicators).
finally, in terms of dyad characteristics, edward Mansfield and Joanne Gowa theorize and find that countries involved in alliances are more likely to form ptas because they can better "internalize" the security externalities of trade, meaning that allies are less concerned 44 Mayer and Zignago 2006. 45 Lawrence 1998 . 46 We also ran our estimations with exports from the partner country to the host country as well as the sum of exports in both directions. neither resulted in significant changes in our results. 47 52 It identifies all formal alliances between dyads in each year of the data set.
In addition to these dyadic factors, several country-level characteristics help to determine the formation of ptas. Mansfield, Milner, and Peter rosendorf show that as countries become more democratic, leaders gain from forming trade agreements.
53 specifically, ptas offer a credible signal for political leaders to demonstrate their policy choices over trade. Thus, we would expect that as a country becomes more democratic, its probability of forming a pta increases. 54 We use the ratings from the Polity IV project two years prior to the current period as a measure of democracy.
55 Polity is the difference between a country's democracy and autocracy scores, both on ten-point scales, so that the resulting variable ranges from -10 to 10.
56 Population is the log of total population measured in the middle of the year, available from the World Development Indicators.
similarly, Mansfield and eric reinhardt show that countries that are members of the wto are more likely to enter into ptas. 57 The authors argue that the uncertain nature of multilateral negotiations drives countries into smaller and regional trading blocs in order to improve their bargaining position in trade rounds and to protect themselves from commercial disruptions and disputes. Thus, we would expect that host-country members of the wto/gatt are more likely to form ptas. wto equals 1 in the year of accession to the gatt or wto and each subsequent year, and 0 otherwise. Membership data are available from the wto. our data cover a balanced panel of 132 low-and middle-income host countries and twenty-three oecd partner countries from 1960 to 2004. To test our models of pta formation, we initially use a logistic 51 Mansfield 1993; Gowa 1994 . 52 Gibler and sarkees 2004. 53 Mansfield, Milner, and rosendorff 2002 . 54 Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006, 2008; Jensen 2003 . 55 Marshall and Jaggers 2004. 56 following imputation, the polity variable ranges from -28 to 26. 57 Mansfield and reinhardt 2003. 58 http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm. regression that included robust standard errors clustered by country so that multiple observations for each country are deemed to be independent. four important issues exist within our data set that must be dealt with in order to estimate the model using a logistic regression technique: serial correlation, rare events, a high degree of missing data, and endogeneity. We deal with each of these issues in turn. method first, it is clear from the issues we are studying that our data set exhibits temporal dependence. Thus, running a standard logistic regression analysis would result in at least incorrect estimations of our standard errors and at worst biased estimates of our coefficients. To correct for the possibility of autocorrelation, we follow the lead of nathaniel Beck, Jonathan Katz, and richard Tucker and include a natural spline function 59 (the number of years from the beginning of our data coverage) to test and account for the possibility of temporal dependence. Tests of time dependence proved to be an issue, and thus we include a natural spline with 5 knots in each of our estimations (results available from the authors). 60 second, Gary King and Langche Zeng demonstrate that finite sample bias exists when the number of events being analyzed is small or unbalanced.
61 our data set is not small, but it is unbalanced, since far fewer dyads have entered into ptas than have not. In our analysis, the full data set includes fewer than 2 percent of cases where our dependent variable is equal to 1. To account for this bias, we use a rare-events correction for our logistic regression.
Third, data on many variables were unavailable for some countryyears. If we use listwise deletion to remove all observations with missing data, our sample size would be reduced by more than 100 countries, most of which fall into the lowest income category. Any inferences made from an analysis using listwise deletion would thus be inefficient. More important, because the missing values are not missing at random, 59 We use newson's (1994) b-spline program to calculate natural splines and knots. 60 Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998) show that problems stemming from temporal dependence can be solved by including dummy variables for each time period in the data set. These time variables would be equivalent to a baseline hazard or the probability for a respective country when all independent variable values are equal to zero. one problem with including each year dummy is that the baseline hazard jumps around from year to year; we would expect changes over time to be smooth, rather than jagged. To smooth the baseline-hazard function, we employ natural splines that are basically smooth functions of our time dummies. employing these splines ameliorates any issues of time dependence in our model while maintaining a smooth baseline hazard rate. our results do not vary if, rather than a natural spline, we include year-to-year dummy variables. 61 King and Zeng 2001. our inferences would be biased. The data-generation process for our data set falls into the category of missing at random. That is, although the lower-income countries are more likely to have missing data than higher-income countries, we are able to predict this difference from other variables in our data set. Therefore, deletion could introduce substantial bias into our study. 62 To deal with this, we use the Amelia 63 program for multiple imputation to replace missing data with the best predictions of the data. 64 Amelia uses the known values of certain variables and correlations across independent variables to generate five data sets with unique values for missing observations. 65 To reflect the level of uncertainty of the estimated values, we use the program clarify 66 to combine the estimated results from each of the five estimations.
next, we perform a number of tests to be sure that our results were not unduly affected by any outlying observations and eliminate any small island nations with population below one million. This leaves us with data on 132 countries over the period . A complete list of countries included in our study is in Appendix 2.
propensIty score matchIng An obvious concern in a study like this is that there exists the possibility that bIts are endogenously determined. We may, for example, expect that country pairs that form bIts are substantively different from country pairs that do not. If this were indeed the case, then our two groups would not be directly comparable in our estimates of pta formation. The data support this fear. Table 1 shows average values of our control variables based on whether a country pair has formed a bIt. In most cases there is a significant difference in the indicator for country pairs that have formed a bIt than for those that have not. Trade flows between country pairs are significantly higher for those that have formed a pta. The skill difference between developing and developed countries is greater for pairs that have not formed a bIt. Also, developing countries that have entered into a bIt have higher democracy scores, higher income levels per capita, and are more likely to have joined the wto. unexpectedly, the difference in the income level between poor and rich governments is greater for country pairs that have signed a bIt. finally, little difference exists in population and whether countries have formed an alliance. 62 King et al. . 63 honaker et al. 2003 Listwise deletion estimates are available from the authors. results did not change substantially, but are not included because of potential bias.
65 . 66 Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003. endogeneity of this form is typically dealt with using either two-stage least squares instrumental variable (2sls-Iv) estimation or a heckman selection model. In each of these cases it would be necessary to have an instrument exogenous to ptas that explains bIt formation. unfortunately, good instruments for bIts are elusive and weak at best.
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Instead of 2sls-Iv or heckman selection, we use propensity score matching to deal with the possibility of endogeneity. Propensity score matching, while relatively unused in the international political economy literature, is commonly used in American politics and in economics. The idea is to imitate a randomized experiment with a treatment and control group where both groups are substantively similar. The "treatment" in our case is bIt formation. Therefore, our treatment group is each country pair with a bIt. We then search among our population of country pairs that do not have a bIt in place for a "control group" with characteristics similar to that of the treatment group-that is, we match our treatment group to a control group. In other words, if the relevant differences between the treatment and control groups can be 67 following Büthe and Milner (2008) as well as elkins, Guzman, and simmons (2006), we did estimate equation (1) using instrumental variables (Iv) with the number of bIts signed by a country's neighbors. This measure is in fact highly correlated with a country's own bIts, but not with the number of p tas signed by a country. unfortunately, two problems with Iv estimation persisted. Most important, tests of the instrument failed standard tests of strength. specifically, the hansen j test rejected the hypothesis that there is no relationship between the instrument and the residuals, indicating that results from the estimation would be biased. Additionally, because our model contains a quadratic term for bIts, an interaction term, as well as two measures of p tas, we were in need of several instruments. The only additional instrument available in the literature (the probability that two countries in a dyad will become members of a p ta/bIt in that year, from Büthe and Milner 2008) was, naturally, correlated with our dependent variable. 68 If we can find an appropriate control group, assignment to the treatment group approximates a random assignment, and we no longer have to worry about endogeneity.
The likelihood of being able to match precisely on each of the observed characteristics is very small. however, matching on the average treatment effect works as consistently as and more efficiently than matching on all covariates. 69 To match on this average treatment effect, we create a propensity score-in this case a probability of treatment, based on observable characteristics. 70 our propensity score is the probability that a country pair in a certain year has formed a bIt. This variable reduces the relevant information from all of our control variables to a single variable. 71 To estimate our propensity score, we include each of the individual covariates outlined above and run a rare events logistic regression (to account for the rarity of bIt formation). The results of the logistic regression are shown in Table 2 .
next we must match our observations based on their propensity scores. There are a number of methods available to match propensity scores, each with benefits and costs. We use the following three: nearestneighbor matching, kernel-based matching, and radius matching. The results of equation (1) for all three techniques (as well as an estimation without matching) are provided in Appendix 3 for comparison purposes. We discuss the alternative matching techniques below, but our main analysis presents the results from radius matching, as it proves the best technique for maximizing efficiency while reducing bias in our estimates.
nearest-neighbor matching matches each country pair that has a bIt to the non-bIt country pair with the closest propensity score and discards the remaining data pairs. Although nearest-neighbor matching reduces bias by selecting distinct pairs to match on, it results in a very high degree of variance because of the large amount of information that is discarded.
72 Kernel-based matching relates each country pair that has a bIt to a weighted sum of individuals with similar propensity scores but without bIts. Those bIt country pairs with propensity scores closest to the propensity score of the treatment pair are given the highest 68 weight; the weight diminishes the farther the propensity score of the treatment pair is from the propensity score of the bIt country pair. Although this method significantly lowers the variance of estimates by using all available country pairs, there is a distinct possibility of weak matches within our data set, and their use in this method would increase the possibility of bias.
In radius matching, all country pairs with propensity scores within a predetermined radius of a treatment pair's propensity score are matched, while those outside the radius of all treatment-pair propensity scores are excluded from the analysis. 73 The advantage of this approach is that when a number of good matches are available, it uses all of the information in those pairs while minimizing the possibility of bad matches when fewer good matches are available. Table 3 looks at the differences across covariates for the two matched groups from our radius matching, and compares the differences to the original sample. from this it is clear that although the difference in means of the covariates has not gone away completely (something that would be nearly impossible to accomplish), it has decreased substantially. More important, the variance ratio has been considerably reduced through the application of matching. Thus, in all of the results that follow, we use rare events logit estimation on the data matched through radius matching.
Iv. results
The results lend considerable support for all three of our hypotheses. specifically, we find that a bIt between a developed and developing country increases the predicted probability that this dyad will subsequently conclude a north-south pta. In fact, up to a point, as a poor government enters into more bIts with rich ones, its predicted probability of forming a pta with a given wealthy state increases. however, 73 Dehejia and Wahba 1999. both of these positive findings are contingent on the number of bIts that the developing country has overall. The same is true of ptas generally. That is, as a poor government enters into greater numbers of bIts and ptas, the positive impact on pta formation of having an investment treaty or a trade agreement actually falls. Table 4 reports the results of equation (1) where all three of our hypotheses as well as corollary 1 are tested. first, we examine the positive relationship between bIts and ptas. The dyadic bIt has a strong, positive influence on pta formation and gives support to our first hypothesis: if a developing country has an investment treaty with a developed one, these pairs are more likely to sign a trade agreement. further, the bitsum is jointly significant and positive, lending credence to the first part of our second hypothesis: as a poor government enters into bIts with other rich ones it is, at first, more likely to get a pta with a given developed country, but both of these relationships are contingent on the total number of investment treaties the developing country has already signed with other wealthy states. These findings raise our central question: is having more bIts better?
To answer, we start by examining the contingent relationship between the individual dyadic bIt and the number of additional bIts the developing county has entered into with other rich governments. The interaction term between the dyadic bIt and the sum of host country bIts (dyadic bit * bitsum) is negative and significant, lending support to corollary 1 that the positive association between a country pair bIt and their probability of forming a pta decreases as the host country enters into a greater number of bIts with other developed countries. Although the probability of forming a pta between a dyad pair will almost always remain positive, the point is that this positive effect diminishes considerably as the developing country enters into more bIts.
We next examine our hypothesis that there may be a nonlinear relationship between the number of bIts a developing country enters into and its likelihood of securing a north-south pta. As noted earlier, the sum of bIts is jointly significant and positive. We add to this the square of the total bIts signed with other wealthy states (bitsum 2 ), which is significant and negative. This confirms our second hypothesis that if a developing country has a few bIts with other developed countries, this pair is more likely to form a pta, but as that developing country signs greater numbers of bIts, this positive effect declines, forming an inverted u-shaped relationship. In particular, after about five bIts, this positive effect begins to decline. (Appendix 4 lists our included developing countries and the number of bIts they have with developed 0.36 *significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%, ^jointly significant at 5%; robust standard errors in parentheses; dependent variable, dyadic p ta ones.) This tipping point is rather striking because the average number of investment treaties for our sample is 6.5, and many have more. Indeed, countries like Algeria, rwanda, and uganda are nearing the point where signing additional bIts will actually reduce their probability of forming additional ptas with other developed countries. More worrisome still, many countries in our sample are already well past that point.
We turn now to our third hypothesis: there may also be a nonlinear relationship between the number of ptas a developing country enters into with other developed countries and its likelihood of securing a north-south pta. As with bIts, the ptasum variable has a positive, significant impact on dyadic pta formation, but the square is significant and negative. This says that forming additional ptas has a positive impact up to a point-nine, to be precise-after which the impact declines. In short, our argument about congestion is just as relevant to trade agreements as it is to investment treaties, the implication being that more of either type of institution erodes the chances of getting an additional north-south pta.
To better understand the magnitude of our effects, we derive the predicted probability of a dyad forming a pta at each level of the sum of other developed country bIts, holding all other variables in the model constant. figure 1 uses the results of Table 4 and holds all countries at the average values of their samples to graphically show the predicted probability results of the interaction term. In it, the predicted probability of pta formation is always positive but this decreases drastically as a country ratifies more investment treaties.
We are also interested in how these probabilities change from the benchmark case in which a developing country has no bIts at all. Table  5 takes this up, comparing this benchmark case to a country with one bIt, and to a country with seven, which is roughly the average in our sample. With no other investment treaties in place, the predicted probability of forming a pta increases from 0.01 to 0.05 when a given dyad enters into a bIt. This probability decreases, however, as a country enters into bIts with other developed countries, falling by over half to 0.02 in the case of seven bIts, our sample average.
To further tease out these substantive effects, we randomly selected a country from each quartile of bIts in the sample and used their current characteristics to predict the probability of them forming a pta with a developed country. Table 6 lists each of the four countries and their odds of getting a trade agreement with and without a bIt in place. for chad and colombia, the probability of forming a pta is higher when these countries anchor a dyad that has a bIt, versus no bIt. how-ever, for Thailand, a country just above the mean of our sample, having a dyadic bIt has no effect on its probability of entering into a pta. Interestingly, for Bangladesh, the country with the highest number of bIts in this exercise, the likelihood of signing a pta actually decreases when it participates in a dyad that has a bIt, as opposed to one that has no bIt. These results lend further support to our hypotheses. Indeed, when a country has a bIt in place with a partner country, the predicted probability of forming a pta is always positive. however, as we move into quartiles with greater numbers of bIts, the difference in predicted probabilities shrinks, and in the highest quartile, a country like Bangladesh has a higher predicted probability of forming a pta with a developed country with which it does not have a bIt. Table 4 , with all other variables held at their means.
fIgure 1 predIcted probabIlIty of pta formatIon It is also interesting to note the direction and significance of the control variables included in our model. Although coefficient estimates from logistic regressions are not highly informative, we are able to get some idea of the relationship and degree of significance of these variables on the formation of a pta. The level of trade between the host and partner countries has the expected positive impact on the formation of a pta. Geographic distance is, as expected, negatively signed; as countries are farther apart geographically, the probability of the dyad forming a pta goes down. Distance is a significant negative predictor of pta formation. similarly, income difference is significant and negative, but its impact on pta formation is minor. The level of skill difference within the dyad is similarly negative, but insignificant. A political-military alliance between the dyad has the predicted positive sign, but again is insignificant.
Turning to host-country characteristics, we see that the level of democracy has an insignificant impact on pta formation, perhaps because of the way our sample is constructed (i.e., we only examine developing countries as hosts). similarly, membership in the gatt/wto has the expected positive sign, but is not significant in our estimation. finally, population is positive and significant, indicating that the larger the host-country market, the more likely a dyad is to form a pta.
robustness checks
We ran a number of checks on the robustness of our results. first, we eliminated all variables that were not significant in the final estimation of the model. Table 7 (column 2) presents the results of this estimation. here, eliminating theoretically important but statistically insignificant variables had no discernable impact on our results. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%; robust standard errors in parentheses; dependent variable, dyadic p ta second, we assessed the importance of using a count of bIts versus weighting a bIt by the importance of the home country. To do this we re-ran equation (1), first looking only at whether a country had a bIt with the united states. second, we substituted our bIt count variable with a bIt count weighted by the gdp of the home country. We used the united states (the country with the largest gdp in the data set) as our reference point and reduced the weight of all other bIts by the difference between that country's gdp and that of the united states. In other words, a country that had a bIt with the united states received a 1 in the year that the bIt was signed and in each subsequent year. But, for example, a country that had a bIt with Japan in 2003 receives only 0.47 because Japan's gdp that year was 47 percent of the united states'. Table 7 (columns 3 and 4) presents the results of these estimations. Again, there was no discernable impact on our results, indicating that bIts have the same effect on ptas regardless of the economic strength of the home country.
finally, we ran two additional tests whose results we do not include because of their similarity to the results in Table 4 . We re-ran equation (1) including the developed country characteristics that were originally included for the developing country. The results were insignificantly different from those shown in Table 4 . further, because of the high degree of collinearity between the bit variable and the interaction term as well as the bitsum 2 variable, its square, and the interaction term, we reran equation (1) using mean-centered versions of the interaction term and bitsum 2 term. Again, the results-while slightly moderated-were not significantly different from the results presented in Table 4 .
v. conclusIon bIts and ptas are among the most scrutinized institutions in the global economy, yet the relationship between them has received scant attention. We argue that investment treaties and trade agreements make northsouth ptas more likely, but only up to a point. The reason is that there is a disconnect between the incentives for rich and poor governments to pair these institutions. Developed countries act on the demands of multinationals to offset the risk of uncompensated expropriation and the cost of getting inputs to and exports from a developing country. But whereas bIts are relatively easy to provide as an answer to the first concern, ptas are a more costly response to the second. Indeed, trade agreements involve deeper and reciprocal obligations than investment treaties, and are thus likely to meet political resistance from antitrade constituents. As a result, wealthy states are likely to supply ptas only where they can expect an electoral reward for doing so, which we expect to be a function of the exporter rents they bestow upon multinationals. Yet, because the preferences that insulate these exporter rents can be congested by foreign competitors, what really matters, in this regard, is how many bIts and ptas the developing country has already concluded with other developed ones.
for their part, poor governments have an incentive to sign investment treaties and trade agreements with rich governments for political as well as economic reasons, including to shore-up a human rights regime or consolidate democracy, for example. Indeed, bIts and ptas enable these governments to credibly tie their hands by pointing to the commercial costs of noncompliance. As a result, they are at risk of concluding more of these institutions than would be ideal from the point of view of developed countries, reducing or even reversing their odds of completing a north-south pta with any given wealthy state. Thus, we hypothesize, and show, that the relationship between bIts and northsouth ptas is curvilinear, and find, in particular, that the tipping point is five bIts, or roughly two fewer than the average developing country in our sample has concluded. related to this, the relationship between a country's ptas with other developed countries and the prospect of signing an additional north-south pta is also curvilinear, with the tipping point at nine. Two implications follow.
first, while the literature on bIts is stalemated on whether they actually increase fdI, our results suggest that their relationship to northsouth ptas may shed new light on this debate. Indeed, by making trade agreements more likely, these investment treaties may have a greater indirect effect than the literature has looked for. recent scholarship suggests that bIts, along with ptas, are especially conducive to attracting fdI, whereas our research implies that this may be because investment treaties make trade agreements more likely in the first place. In this sense, for all the doubts observers raise about bIts, bIts cannot be dismissed as mere cheap talk, since they raise the prospects of getting a north-south pta with all the deeper and reciprocal obligations that these entail.
second, the positive effect that a bIt has on the chances of getting a trade agreement does not mean that more is better in this regard. There is a widely held view among scholars and policymakers that many institutional memberships more credibly signal that a country is "open for business." While more affiliations may undoubtedly serve other political objectives, they do not linearly boost the odds of secur-ing a north-south pta. our results indicate that after five bIts this positive effect begins to fall, and that for countries like Bangladesh, which has twelve, the relationship actually reverses. This means that in pursuit of an additional pta, Bangladesh would be better off if it had no investment treaties at all. Given the growing body of evidence that developing countries are likely to enjoy greater economic prosperity where investment and trade reforms coincide, 74 the implication is that poor governments need to carefully consider which ptas they wantsince the challenge is to sign the right few-before rich governments begin to turn away from the negotiating table. 
